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“Jobs in general ought not to be an insuperable problem for Mr. 
Obama in Ohio: the unemployment rate, at 7%, is nearly a point 
below the national average (…). Mr. Obama, though, has to share 
some of the credit for Ohio’s solid recovery with John Kasich, the 
hyper-energetic Republican governor (…). That makes it hard for 
independent voters to know whom to praise and whom to blame.” 
The Economist, 27 October 2012, p. 39. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A key feature of federal government structures is that authority over many 
competences – e.g., unemployment, education, crime, or infrastructure – is 
distributed across different levels of government (Jametti and Joanis, 2009; 
Widmer and Zweifel, 2012). Nevertheless, a country’s laws rarely provide a 
clear delineation of the distribution of power. The 10
th
 Amendment to the US 
Constitution, for example, merely states that all powers not expressly awarded 
by the Constitution to the federal government are delegated to the states. A 
similar arrangement exists in, amongst others, Belgium, Germany and 
Switzerland. As a result, it often becomes hard for voters to understand whether 
the national or local incumbent is responsible for policy outcomes. Both mass 
media (see citation from The Economist above) and academics (Anderson, 
2006, 2008; Joanis, 2009, forthcoming) therefore have argued that multilevel 
governance structures decrease the clarity of governments’ responsibility, and 
political accountability. 
In this article, we argue that politicians’ membership of political parties 
provides a mechanism to alleviate this accountability problem under multilevel 
governance structures. We thereby exploit the fact that politicians’ party 
membership provides important cues about their characteristics and likely 
behaviour once elected. This is supported by a substantial literature arguing that 
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political parties develop reputations for holding specific policy positions 
through their electoral and parliamentary activities (Aldrich, 1995; Snyder and 
Ting, 2002, 2003), and sustain this ‘brand name’ through party discipline 
(Caillaud and Tirole, 2002; Castanheira and Crutzen, 2009). Even in the 
absence of party discipline, intra-party cohesion is supported by politicians’ 
self-selection into parties sharing their preferences, and political parties’ 
preference for fairly homogeneous candidates (Jones and Hudson, 1998).
1
 
While all parties arguably contain ‘good’ and bad’ politicians from an ethical 
point of view, the above processes imply that parties’ politicians are 
characterized by certain policy preferences associated with their ideology. For 
example, left-wing politicians are more likely to react to high unemployment 
with demand-side politics (e.g., increased expenditures) while right-wing 
politicians generally prefer supply-side policies (e.g., lower taxes). Voters 
facing high unemployment know that one of these will constitute the 
appropriate recipe, but do not a priori know which policy – and party – will be 
more successful as this might depend on the context.  
The key point is that when politicians of the same party share such 
similarities in terms of ideology, policy agenda, etc. the policy preferences of 
any given candidate become correlated to those of other politicians of the same 
party. This, we argue, provides voters with important information (which, in 
extreme cases, may be the only information available). We refer to this as party 
cues.  That is, party cues are defined as the process through which party labels 
of candidates increase the information available to voters. In principle, this may 
                                                 
1
  One could argue that this holds mainly for the rank-and-file of the party. At higher 
levels, the party may well face a trade-off between intra-party cohesion and the need 
for charismatic leaders able to attract (new) voters (Padro-i-Miquel and Snowberg 
2011).  
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work both horizontally (i.e., relative to politicians of the same party in 
neighboring jurisdictions) or vertically (i.e., at different levels of government). 
Indeed, while the importance of horizontal comparisons was initially 
highlighted by Salmon (1989) and formalized by Besley and Case (1995), Geys 
and Vermeir (2008a) illustrate that the information obtained from such 
comparisons is affected by partisan connections between politicians in 
neighboring states (i.e., on whether or not horizontal party cues can be 
exploited). In this paper, we instead focus on vertical party cues, whereby 
voters can judge the national incumbent by taking into account her partisan 
attachment and that of the regional incumbent. Our central argument is that such 
(vertical) party cues can help voters in their assessment of candidates based on 
observed economic outcomes in elections under multilevel institutional settings.  
Our theoretical model first of all shows that when a national and regional 
politician are from the same party (i.e., political power is ‘aligned’ across levels 
of government), regional public output remains informative to voters evaluating 
the national incumbent even when she has no influence on this output – 
provided that intra-party correlation in politicians’ policy preferences is 
positive. The intuition is that, although the positive policy outcome is attributed 
to the regional incumbent, it rubs off on the national incumbent through 
politicians’ partisan connection. Second, when the national and regional 
politician are from different parties (i.e., political power is ‘unaligned’), 
regional public output has a weaker positive effect – and can have a negative 
effect – on the national incumbent. This results from the partisan connection 
between the regional incumbent and the national opposition candidate, which 
informs voters that the candidate fielded in the federal election by the party of 
the regional incumbent is likely to be a better choice than the national 
incumbent. Both predictions suggest that regional public output affects the 
national incumbent’s election result differently in aligned versus unaligned 
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regions. This is confirmed using state-level data from ten US presidential 
elections between 1972 and 2008. Nevertheless, while increasing the 
information content of public policy outcomes, the availability of party cues is 
not a uniquely positive force. We indeed show that they may cause the national 
incumbent to exert zero effort when the incumbents at various government 
levels are unaligned. We return to the policy implications of these observations 
below. 
This article contributes to the literature on the costs and benefits of 
multilevel governance structures in terms of government accountability 
(Seabright, 1996; Myerson, 2006; Hatfield and Padro-i-Miquel, 2012). 
Seabright (1996) argues that accountability may be compromised in a 
centralised system because at least some regions’ welfare (and votes) may 
become irrelevant to “determine the re-election of the government” (Seabright, 
1996: 61). Myerson (2006) argues that politicians can prove their qualifications 
at the local level in a federalist structure, which provides information to voters 
when these politicians subsequently compete for public office at the national 
level. Hatfield and Padro-i-Miquel (2012) show that a multilevel government 
structure can help to solve a commitment problem at the federal level. Our 
analysis concentrates on the incomplete information problem discussed by 
Anderson (2006, 2008), Myerson (2006) and Joanis (2009, forthcoming) rather 
than the ‘redundancy effect’ and commitment problems discussed, respectively, 
by Seabright (1996) and Hatfield and Padro-i-Miquel (2012). 
In the next section, we develop a simple model detailing our theoretical 
argument. Then, we turn to an empirical test of the model’s main predictions 
using state-level data from US presidential elections. Finally, we discuss the 
implications of our analysis. 
 
2. THEORETICAL MODEL 
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To present the argument most clearly and derive testable hypotheses, we set 
up a simple career concerns model in the spirit of Persson and Tabellini (2000) 
and Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2006) that includes a federal 
government structure with one national government and M regional 
jurisdictions. For simplicity, we limit the number of political parties to two – 
i.e., an incumbent and an opposition party, though these roles may differ across 
jurisdictions and levels of government.
2
 In each jurisdiction, public output (x) is 
determined by the policy preferences or policy ‘quality’ of the national and 
regional incumbents as well as their respective efforts. The policy quality is 
represented by the variable q, which is drawn from an unbounded normal 
distribution with E(q)=0 and Var(q)=
2
q  (it is crucial that q is not iid, see 
below). Effort, denoted by e, is costly, and assumed to be strictly positive 0e  
(we return to this below). The cost function C(e) is increasing and strictly 
convex with C(0)=0. We also assume that the national incumbent (represented 
via subscript n) can exert a different effort in each region i, with her total cost of 
effort given by )(
1



M
i
nin eCC . Both effort (e) and quality (q) are unobservable 
to voters. We can then write public output in each jurisdiction i (=1,…,M) as: 
 
))(1()( ririnninni eqweqwx   (1) 
 
                                                 
2
  We assume that the party systems at the federal and sub-national level are completely 
analogous. While full analogy rarely occurs in reality, extensive overlap in the party 
systems at various levels of government exists, for instance, in the US, Germany and 
Belgium (within both parts of the country), though only to a lesser extent in, say, 
Canada or Spain. 
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Here, qn and qri represent the policy quality of the national incumbent and of 
the regional incumbent in region i, and eni and eri are their respective efforts.
3
 
The weight of the national incumbent in determining public output in a 
particular jurisdiction is represented by nw ,with 10  nw  (Solé-Ollé and 
Sorribas-Navarro, 2008). This weight captures the effect of asymmetric federal 
designs where different levels of government bear responsibility for a given 
policy area to varying degrees. In line with the observation that most federal 
systems are characterised by symmetric sub-national competences (e.g., 
Belgium, Germany, Spain, US), we here assume that wn is the same for all 
jurisdictions. Note, however, that our results remain valid if we allow for 
asymmetries as long as wn>0 for all jurisdictions. Crucially, the variable q can, 
but need not, be correlated across politicians. Specifically, we model the idea 
that politicians within any given party are “to some extent interchangeable” 
(Geys and Vermeir, 2008a: 471) by assuming a joint probability distribution in 
which the q’s of politicians of the same party have a positive correlation 
(0<<1) and the q’s of politicians from different parties are independent (=0). 
These correlations are common knowledge. In other words, it is the party 
membership of politicians – and not that of voters – that acts as a cue towards 
politicians’ characteristics.4,5 For ease of reference, we encapsulate this in the 
following definition. 
                                                 
3
  This simple representation of public output is open to various extensions such as the 
introduction of cost shocks, a fixed tax burden related to public output, or multiple 
policy variables. We abstain from such extensions and analyse the most basic set-up 
to illustrate the effect of politicians’ intra-party similarity. 
4
  One could make  depend on voters’ partisan membership and assume that voters 
know more about the value of  within their own party. This, however, is not critical 
to the current analysis. 
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Definition 1 
Party cues exist when the intra-party correlation in policy quality () is strictly 
larger than 0. 
 
The timing of the two-period model is as follows. At the beginning of period 
1, a federal government is established, as well as a regional government in each 
jurisdiction i. To abstract from complications when allowing politicians to gain 
experience from multiple terms in office, we assume these governments have 
not been in office before and no historical information is available about them. 
Then, public output comes about as a function of politicians’ policy preferences 
and efforts, and output is observed by voters.
6
 At the end of period 1, the 
incumbents – who are assumed to be vote-maximizers – face an election in 
which they are either re-elected or replaced by a candidate of the opposition 
party. Below, we focus on federal-level elections and the behaviour of the 
national incumbent. In period 2, politicians again exert their optimal efforts and, 
together with their policy preferences q, this again leads to public output. 
As there are no new elections in period 2, incumbents will exert zero effort 
in period 2, and voters – valuing public output – will vote for the candidate with 
                                                                                                                       
5
  In a paper that is conceptually closest to ours, Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2008) 
analyse federal-level grant allocations across aligned and unaligned local-level 
governments. We instead look at how policy outcomes across (un)aligned 
governments affect election results. However, the biggest theoretical difference lies in 
the fact that Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2008) treat parties as monolithic actors. 
Our theoretical model refines this assumption via the concept of party cues. 
6
  We assume that voters only observe public output in their own jurisdiction. Still, it is 
possible to extend the model to the case where voters observe public output also in 
neighboring jurisdictions (as long as they cannot observe output in all jurisdictions). 
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the highest expected q in the first-period elections. They thereby use the first 
period’s public output to update their beliefs about the national incumbent and, 
when possible, the national opposition candidate. The ex post conditional 
expectation of q given the outcomes observed in the first period (i.e., E(q|xi)) is 
then a weighted average of the ex ante mean of q (assumed to be 0) and public 
output. Based on these updated beliefs, voters decide on their vote (see below). 
Hence, voters are backward-looking, using historic performance to decide about 
their vote because this might reliably signal information about politicians 
(Persson and Tabellini, 2000). 
Clearly, this final step relies on specifying the voters’ decision-rule. 
Following Revelli (2002) and Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2008), we 
assume a stochastic voting rule under which the probability that a voter in 
region i casts a ballot in favour of the national incumbent (Sni) can be written as: 
 
 0)()(Pr  iioinni xqExqES   (2) 
 
where subscripts o and n refer to the national opposition candidate and 
incumbent, respectively, and α is a zero-mean, normally distributed random 
term with variance 
2)( iiVar   , which is uncorrelated to q.
7
 To evaluate Sni, 
we need expressions for voters’ updated beliefs about the q of the national 
incumbent (E(qn|xi)) and opposition candidate (E(qo|xi)). This implies analysing 
the relation between the policy quality of the national incumbent and opposition 
candidate and public output in the region. Given the assumptions above, the 
policy quality of the national incumbent and public output (i.e., qn and xi) as 
                                                 
7
  One might also allow for a non-zero mean of α representing, for example, an 
incumbency advantage (Grossman and Helpman, 1996; Konrad, 2002; Mehlum and 
Moene, 2006).  This does not affect our findings. 
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well as the national opposition candidate’s policy quality and public output (i.e., 
qo and xi) follow a multivariate normal distribution. Consequently, voters’ 
updated beliefs concerning the incumbent can be written as (see DeGroot, 1970; 
Theil, 1971; Meyer and Vickers, 1997): 
 
 frinfnini
ninnnn
ninn
in ewewx
wwww
ww
xqE )1(
)1(2)1(
)1(
)(
22






 (3) 
 
In this expression 
f
nie  and 
f
rie are the voters’ forecasts of the effort exerted in 
period 1 by the national and regional incumbent, respectively, and ni reflects 
the strength of the partisan cue between the national and regional incumbents. 
Similarly, the updated belief regarding the opposition candidate is: 
 
 frinfnini
ninnnn
oin
io ewewx
wwww
w
xqE )1(
)1(2)1(
)1(
)(
22






 (4) 
 
where oi indicates the strength of the partisan cue between the national 
opposition candidate and the regional incumbent. Using expressions (3) and (4), 
we can rewrite equation (2) as  
 
  0)1(Pr  ifrinfniniini ewewxS   
where 
ninnnn
oininn
i
wwww
ww



)1(2)1(
))(1(
22 

  (5) 
 
The coefficient βi in the stochastic voting rule (5) reflects the strength of the 
relation between public output xi and the national incumbent’s vote share Sni. As 
discussed, politicians choose their effort to maximise their vote share. 
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Assuming the national vote share is the average of the vote share in each 
jurisdiction (with equal weight for each jurisdiction), the national incumbent 
maximizes her vote share in each region. Hence, effort in period 1 is decided by 
assessing the expected vote share in equation (5). Since the left hand side of the 
inequality in (5) follows a normal distribution, the incumbent’s expected vote 
share as a function of her effort level equals:
8
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






22222
nini
))1(2)1((
)1()1(
1)e(S
iqninnnni
f
rinrin
f
ninnini
wwww
ewewewew


 (6) 
Where Φ[.] represents the cumulative distribution function of the standard 
normal distribution. The incumbent therefore chooses effort nie in region i such 
as to maximize: 
 



 
M
i nini
M
i nini eCB
M
eS
1
1 )(
)(
 (7) 
 
Here B stands for the net benefit linked to a higher national vote share, 
while M, as mentioned, is the number of regions. We implicitly assume that a 
higher vote share allows capturing a higher share of the benefit even when the 
incumbent fails to be re-elected. This reflects the idea that opposition leaders 
are often more powerful when the opposition obtains a higher vote share (Heclo 
1974; Strom 1990). 
Optimal effort in region i is obtained by deriving the first-order condition, 
which effectively states that, in equilibrium, the marginal gain in terms of 
                                                 
8
 To see this, note that the left hand side of the inequality presented in equation (5) has 
mean  frinrinfninnini ewewewew )1()1(   and variance 
 22222 ))1(2)1(( iqninnnni wwww   . 
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average vote share (and benefit) should exactly compensate the marginal cost of 
effort. Using that under rational expectations voters’ forecasts of politicians’ 
effort are correct in equilibrium, optimal effort can be characterized as: 
 
)(
)))1(2)1(((2 22222
ni
iqninnnni
in eC
wwwwM
Bw

 

 (8) 
 
From equation (8), it can be shown that effort of the national incumbent is 
higher when i  and benefits B  are larger. However, effort decreases with the 
variance of the left-hand side of the voting rule in equation (5). Note also that as 
i  can become negative, a corner solution in which effort is zero may arise (we 
return to this below). 
Equations (5) and (8) provide the basic ingredients for analysing the effect of 
party cues () in elections under multilevel governance. To do so, two cases 
must be distinguished. In the first case, incumbents at the national and regional 
level are aligned (such that ni = ), which implies, given that there are only 
two parties, that the regional incumbent is unaligned with the national 
opposition candidate (oi = 0). In a second case, the national and regional 
incumbents are unaligned (ni = 0), and, therefore, the regional incumbent 
belongs to the party of the national opposition candidate (oi = ). Substituting 
this information into equation (5), we find for the case of aligned incumbents 
that: 
 



)1(2)1(
)1(
22
nnnn
nn
a
wwww
ww


  (9) 
 
Similarly, the case with unaligned incumbents leads to: 
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In the absence of any party cues (ni = oi = 0), we simply have: 
22 )1( nn
n
n
ww
w

                   (11) 
 
A first set of key results concerns the effects of regional public output on the 
national incumbent’s election result. It is easy to see that equations (9), (10) and 
(11) all converge to one when the weight of the national incumbent on public 
output (wn) tends to one, but converge to different values when wn goes to zero. 
Indeed, equation (9) converges to , equation (10) converges to –, and 
equation (11) to zero. These observations have several interesting implications. 
Firstly, it indicates that regional public output can retain an impact on the 
national incumbent’s election result – even when she has no influence on this 
output (i.e. wn=0) – provided that the intra-party correlation in q is positive (i.e., 
 > 0). Intuitively, this result derives from the fact that regional public output 
rubs off on the national incumbent through her partisan connection to the 
regional incumbent (who is awarded full credit for xi when wn=0) in the aligned 
case, or through the partisan connection of the national opposition candidate to 
the regional incumbent in the unaligned case. Hence, even when there is little or 
no direct evidence upon which to evaluate the national incumbent, voters in a 
federal system can still infer something about her via the indirect information 
contained in party cues.  
 
Proposition 1  
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When party cues exist as defined under Definition 1, even when the national 
incumbent has no influence on regional policy outcomes (wn=0), public 
output can still affect the election result of the national incumbent. 
 
Secondly, for wn<1, it always holds that the impact of output on the election 
results of the national incumbent is greater in the aligned compared to unaligned 
case: a > u. The intuition is as follows. In the aligned case, public output that 
voters attribute to the regional incumbent will also reflect favourably on the 
national incumbent. This increases the extent to which local output translates 
into vote share for the national incumbent. In the unaligned case, however, 
attribution of public output to the regional incumbent will reflect favourably on 
the national opposition candidate (through these politicians’ partisan 
connection). Moreover, when wn</(1+), the effect of regional public output 
on the national incumbent becomes negative in the unaligned case. In other 
words, if  is large enough or wn small enough, the indirect positive impact on 
the national opposition candidate of the favourable evaluation of the regional 
incumbent can more than offset the direct positive effect of public output on the 
national incumbent. Consequently, the overall effect of public output on the 
latter’s electoral result becomes negative. 
 
Proposition 2  
When the national incumbent is not fully responsible for regional output 
(wn<1), the effect of regional public output on the national incumbent’s vote 
share is greater when the national and regional incumbent are aligned, 
compared to when they are unaligned (a>u). In the unaligned case, the 
effect of public output on the national incumbent’s election result becomes 
negative when wn</(1+). 
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Proof:  
Using equations (9) and (10), a>u implies that: 
   0)1()1(2   nnn www   (12) 
 
Given that nw  and  are constrained to lie between 0 and 1, equality (12) 
always holds when wn<1.  
 
To prove that the impact on the vote share can become negative in the unaligned 
case, it suffices to state that 
0
)1(
)1(
22




nn
nn
u
ww
ww 
 when 0)1(  nn ww , or wn</1+. ■ 
 
While these ‘positive’ implications of our theoretical model will be tested 
empirically below, a second set of key findings is of a more normative nature. 
The first of these is that party cues generally decrease voters’ uncertainty 
regarding their vote choice. To see this, remember that individuals’ vote choice 
is determined by the difference in the (expected) quality between the national 
incumbent and opposition candidate. It can be shown, however, that party cues 
tend to reduce the variance, conditional on observed output, of the difference in 
quality between national incumbent and opposition candidate (which reflects 
voters’ uncertainty on the difference in quality). This is always true in the 
aligned case but only materializes in the unaligned case whenever 
)2/(  nw  (for details and proof, see Lemma 1 in the appendix). The 
second normative implication of our model concerns the incentives for the 
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national (and regional) incumbent to exert effort.
9
 Using the fact that C(e) is 
increasing and strictly convex, we can indeed exploit equation (8) to compare 
the optimal effort choices under various settings. This provides two insights. 
First, the national incumbent always exerts more effort in a unitary compared to 
a federal context. The intuition is that the impact of effort is weighted by a 
factor wn≤1 in a federal setting whereas effort counts fully in a unitary setting 
(since wn=1). Furthermore, the impact of public output on the national 
incumbent’s vote share () tends to be lower in a federal compared to a unitary 
context. This is always true when wn < 1/2, and holds more generally when the 
national and regional incumbents are unaligned (details and proof provided in 
Lemma 2 in the appendix). 
Secondly, within a federal setting, we can assess whether party cues affect 
the incentives for the national incumbent to exert effort. In the unaligned case, 
we can show that party cues always decrease the impact of public output on the 
national incumbent’s vote share (see Lemma 3 in the appendix), which reduces 
her effort. In the aligned context, however, two opposing effects occur. On the 
one hand, party cues increase the impact of public output on the national 
                                                 
9
  In the version of the model presented here, we take the behaviour of the regional 
politician as given (reflecting a sort of partial equilibrium analysis). Still, given that 
effort and quality at the regional and national level enter in the determination of public 
output as substitutes (see equation (1)), we verified that our key results are unaffected 
when both national and regional efforts are chosen optimally. Specifying the same 
voting rule and cost-of-effort function for national and regional politicians, this 
extension also shows that the impact of party cues on regional politicians’ incentives 
to exert effort is similar to those of the national politician discussed in the main text. 
Even so, without specifying a particular functional form of the cost-of-effort function, 
the effect of party cues on the overall effort of both the regional and national 
politician cannot be unequivocally determined (full details upon request). 
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incumbent’s vote share whenever wn < 1/2 (see Lemma 3 in the appendix), 
which increases her effort. However, party cues also increase the denominator 
of the left-hand side of equation (8), which has a negative effect on effort. 
Therefore, in the aligned case, party cues can either increase or decrease effort 
depending on the relative size of the variance of q and ias well as the level of 
wn). 
Consequently, although we saw in Proposition 2 that the impact of public 
output on the national incumbent’s vote share is always greater in the aligned 
compared to the unaligned case, the same is not necessarily true for the level of 
effort exerted by the national incumbent. In particular, effort will tend to be 
smaller (larger) in the aligned compared to the unaligned case when 
2
q  is 
larger (smaller) relative to 
2
i . Of course, effort will certainly be higher in the 
aligned case whenever wn</(1+) since in that case effort is zero in the 
unaligned case (while it is always positive in the aligned case).
10
 We combine 
these insights into one single proposition related to the national incumbents’ 
effort choice. 
 
Proposition 3  
The national incumbent exerts more effort in a unitary compared to a federal 
context. In the federal context, 
                                                 
10
  This is a direct corollary from the fact that u<0 when wn</(1+) (see Proposition 
2). A negative value of  indeed induces a corner solution to equation (8) in which 
e=0. Note that this follows from our assumption that effort is non-negative. 
Allowing for negative effort (or ‘sabotage’; Konrad, 2000; Chen, 2003) could lead 
to situations where the national incumbent actively undermines public output in 
regions with unaligned incumbents. 
 18 
 (i) party cues can either increase or decrease the national incumbent’s 
effort when the national and regional incumbents are aligned. 
(ii) party cues always decrease effort when the national and regional 
incumbents are unaligned. The national incumbent will exert zero effort in 
this setting when wn</(1+). 
(iii) the national incumbent’s effort when the national and regional 
incumbent are aligned may exceed or fall short of the effort exerted when 
they are unaligned depending on wn, , 
2
i  and 
2
q . 
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
3.1. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
Our empirical analysis exploits data on US presidential election outcomes 
across all 50 US states over the period 1972-2008 to test Propositions 1 and 2. 
The US federal structure, its two-party system (with the same parties operating 
at the federal and state-level) and the division of power between both parties 
across states provides a context in close accordance with our theoretical model. 
Following the vast literature on economic voting (for a review, see Lewis-Beck 
and Stegmaier, 2007), our central estimation equation takes the following form 
(with subscripts i and t referring to state and time respectively): 
 
 Votesi,t = i + δ1 StateEconi,t + δ2 Controlsi,t + t + i,t 
 
The dependent variable – Votesi,t – is the share of the two-party-vote 
obtained by the incumbent-party candidate in state i in year t. For the 2008-
election, it thus represents the share of votes cast in favour of John McCain 
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(from those cast for either McCain or Obama), as he represented the party of the 
previous incumbent (i.e., George W. Bush). Still, all results reported below 
remain valid when we define the dependent variable as the incumbent-party 
vote total as a share of all votes cast. The central explanatory variables are 
captured in the vector StateEconi,t. First, we include state-level per capita 
personal income growth over the two years prior to the election, measured in 
2000 dollars, obtained from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis.
11
 Second, we 
introduce total per capita state debt outstanding at the end of the election year, 
likewise measured in 2000 dollars, obtained from the US Census Bureau.
12
 The 
former is used to assesses the effect of economic conditions on election 
outcomes (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2007), while the latter measures the 
fiscal conservativeness of the US population (Peltzman, 1992; Geys and 
                                                 
11
  While the two-year period was chosen to match the time period between midterm 
and presidential elections, our results are robust to using the growth rate in state-
level per capita personal income over 1, 3 or 4 years. The same is true when 
employing state-level GDP growth rather personal income growth. 
12
  While outstanding debt is admittedly a stock variable, we prefer this over the growth 
of debt for two reasons. First, voters are more likely to obtain information about the 
stock of debt rather than its growth rate through the media. Second, politicians 
inheriting high debt become ‘associated’ with this if it is not dealt with sufficiently 
quickly (much like inheriting a war; see Mueller, 1973). Note also that including 
other fiscal variables – such as total tax revenues, total own revenues (i.e., total 
revenues minus federal-level grants), budget deficit as a share of total revenues or 
interest repayments (all measured in 2000 dollars and per capita) – does not affect 
our main conclusions. As the high correlation between such fiscal variables generates 
significant multicollinearity problems when introducing more than one of them, we 
constrain ourselves to public debt in the final model. The latter variable produces the 
strongest results (in terms of R² and statistical significance), and always retains 
statistical significance when introducing any other fiscal variable. 
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Vermeir, 2008b). It is important to point out here that state-level fiscal policies 
in the US are usually significantly constrained by state-level fiscal rules, which 
have been shown to be a key determinant of state-level fiscal performance (Alt 
and Lowry, 1994). Consequently, state-level fiscal outcomes are more likely to 
be predominantly driven by state-level political decisions compared; in terms of 
our theoretical model, this implies that wn is substantially smaller for state-level 
indebtedness than for economic growth. This difference is important as it 
implies that state-level fiscal outcomes should not greatly affect federal election 
outcomes, except via incumbents’ party-political connections.  
Our vector of control variables consists of four variables, following Kahane 
(2009). First, we include a dummy variable equal to 1 if the current president 
runs for re-election (0 otherwise), measuring the sitting presidents’ incumbency 
advantage (Fair, 1996). Second, we introduce the level of voter turnout, 
measured as the percentage of the voting age population that cast a ballot. 
Third, we control for the ‘home-grown’ effect, which argues that presidential 
election candidates have an advantage in their state of origin (Kjar and Laband, 
2002; Kahane, 2009), by including two dummy variables. One (Home IPC) is 
set equal to 1 if a state is the home-state of the incumbent presidential candidate 
in a given year (0 otherwise), while the other (Home RPC) equals 1 for the 
home-state of the rival party candidate in a given year (0 otherwise). Finally, we 
include state (αi) and year (t) fixed effects throughout all estimations. 
Especially the latter are critical as they capture time-specific effects that are 
invariant across states (e.g., the influence of the federal-level incumbent). 
Hence, by including them in the regression model, we estimate state-level 
economic effects controlling for any influence of federal-level economics.
13
 
                                                 
13
  Note that, given the definition of our dependent variable, our fixed effects 
effectively capture the state‐specific propensity (constant over time) to vote for an 
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Crucially, we estimate the above regression equation separately for states 
where the governor is aligned or unaligned in terms of partisan attachment with 
the US president.
14
 This separation allows evaluating whether economic 
conditions have different effects across both types of states, as predicted by our 
theoretical model. Identification of such effects is feasible since there is 
substantial variation in the partisan alignment of governors and presidents 
across states as well as within states over time. For each presidential election 
year in our sample, between 20 (in 1980) and 37 (in 1976) US states have a 
governor that is unaligned with the US president and all US states shift their 
alignment status at least once during the sample period (see Table 1). However, 
a key identifying assumption underlying this approach is that the selection of 
states in both subsamples is independent of any factors that may simultaneously 
affect presidential election results at the state level and state-level economic 
variables. From this perspective, it is reassuring to learn from Table 2 that 
                                                                                                                       
incumbent party. In the empirical analysis, as in the theoretical model, an underlying 
assumption here is that the state-level propensity to vote for an aligned or unaligned 
incumbent does not depend on the incumbents’ party affiliation. Still, as there 
appears no clear theoretical reason to expect a difference in any particular direction, 
this does not appear overly constraining. 
14
  In the US political system, a state governor faced with a legislature controlled (at 
least in part) by the other party may have limited ability to implement her preferred 
legislative agenda (Fiorina, 1992; Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995; Schelker, 2012). As 
an alternative – and more stringent – measure of partisan (un)alignment, we 
therefore combined information about both the state governor and the state 
legislature (i.e., aligned states then should have a governor as well as house and 
senate majorities from the president’s party). Although the aligned sample becomes 
fairly small in this setting (N=85), our results remain qualitatively unchanged (see 
Table 5 below). We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this insight. 
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although the aligned and unaligned subsamples show some differentiation on 
the main explanatory variable, they are not significantly different along a series 
of observable dimensions (e.g., state personal income growth, state GDP 
growth, total debt, voter turnout, fiscal deficit, federal-level grants, status as oil 
producer (dummy=1 if more than 1% of US oil production), population size and 
term limit legislation). Even so, we discuss several possible threats to our 
identification strategy in more detail below. 
____________________ 
Tables 1 and 2 about here 
____________________ 
Before turning to the results, we should also note that, rather than separate 
the sample, we could also employ the full sample and add interactions between 
our economic variables and indicator variables designating whether the state 
governor is of the same or a different party than the US president. While this 
methodological choice does not affect our conclusions (see Table 5 below), we 
prefer using separate samples as we rely on a fixed-effects estimator. The 
resulting deviations-from-state-means become less meaningful when states shift 
within the sample period from having a governor aligned with the US president 
to having an unaligned governor (as occurs frequently, see Table 1). Hence, our 
main identification derives from within-state variation within a given group of 
states (i.e. aligned or unaligned) rather than mere within-state variation (as in 
the full-sample results in Table 5 below). 
 
3.2. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Our baseline findings are summarized in Table 3. Columns (1) through (3) 
report results including state-level personal income growth as the economic 
variable, while Columns (4) through (6) also include state debt. In both cases, 
we report results for the full sample (Columns (1) and (4)), as well as those 
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separated for states where the governor is of the same (Columns (2) and (5)) or 
a different (Columns (3) and (6)) party than the US president. To correct for the 
varying size of the US states, we rely on heteroscedasticity-consistent standard-
errors in all regressions and weigh all regressions by the voting age population 
of 1988.
15
 
To start our discussion with a brief look at the results for the control 
variables, we see that voter turnout never adds significantly to the model,
16
 
while incumbency status has, in line with expectations, a very large and positive 
effect on the incumbent-party vote share. This incumbency effect is consistently 
stronger in unaligned compared to aligned states, which confirms earlier 
findings that the incumbency effect is “greatest in districts where voter 
partisanship is (…) aligned against the incumbent” (Ansolabehere et al., 2000, 
18; see also Erikson, 1971; Hirano and Snyder, 2009). This may reflect the idea 
that incumbency and the ensuing name recognition and ability “to utilize the 
direct office-holder benefits” (Hirano and Snyder, 2009, 293) is especially 
important in politically less sympathetic environments, or that incumbents in 
                                                 
15
 While this weighting scheme intends to capture the unequal importance of states in 
the presidential race (see also Kahane, 2009), dropping these weights leaves our 
findings qualitatively unaffected (although significance levels tend to be reduced 
somewhat). 
16
 One could argue that voter turnout and vote choice are joint decisions, leading to a 
potential concern about simultaneity bias in our estimates. Our results remain 
unaffected, however, when excluding turnout from the model, or when implementing 
a 3SLS approach that simultaneously estimates a turnout equation (inspired by Geys, 
2006, this turnout model includes lagged voter turnout, the closeness of the previous 
presidential election and the number of registered voters in 1988 as key explanatory 
variables, as well as our remaining control variables). We are grateful to an 
anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
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“vulnerable situations must work especially hard to remain in place” 
(Ansolabehere et al., 2000, 19; Erikson, 1971). Both variables capturing ‘home-
grown’ effects also provide signs in line with theoretical predictions. 
Incumbent-party candidates obtain a better electoral result in their home state 
(though not significantly so), but do significantly worse in the home state of 
their opponent. The latter effect is exclusively driven by states where the 
incumbent is of the opposing party compared to the federal-level incumbent 
party candidate.  
Turning to the central economic variables, Column (1) illustrates that 
economic growth significantly benefits the incumbent party candidate. 
Crucially, however, Columns (2) and (3) illustrate that the positive effect of 
economic growth is more than three times as strong when the state governor and 
US president belong to the same party, compared to the situation where both 
incumbents belong to different parties (in line with proposition 2). Interestingly, 
as shown in the next-to-last row in Table 3, the difference between both effects 
is also statistically significant at conventional levels (Chi²(1)=3.03; p=0.08). 
The explanation lies in the fact that, as discussed in Section 2, positive 
economic conditions in unaligned states not only benefit the federal-level 
incumbent party candidate in that state, but also the candidate of the opposition 
party (through his partisan connection with the state-level incumbent). 
Nonetheless, this indirect effect on the federal-level opposition candidate is not 
strong enough to offset the direct effect on the federal-level incumbent party 
candidate (see proposition 2). 
Adding state-level debt to the regressions in Columns (4) through (6) (note 
that we lose one year of observations as we lack data on state-level fiscal 
variables in 2008) does not affect the qualitative nature of the above findings, 
although the difference between the coefficient estimates of state personal 
income growth in both groups is now no longer statistically significant 
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(Chi²(1)=1.61; p>0.10).
17
 Moreover, the coefficient estimate of state-level debt 
itself is unexpectedly positive and statistically significant (Column (4)). This 
appears to go against the common view of fiscally conservative voters 
(Peltzman, 1992; Geys and Vermeir, 2008b). Separating states where governors 
belong to the same or a different party than the US president in Columns (5) and 
(6), however, illustrates that state-level debt has a statistically significant 
negative effect in the former and a statistically significant positive effect in the 
latter. This supports both the fiscal conservativeness of the US population as 
well as our theoretical propositions. Indeed, in states where both incumbents 
(i.e., at federal and state level) are from the same party, fiscally conservative 
voters will take high debt levels as a bad signal concerning the federal-level 
incumbent party candidate because she is linked to the fiscally irresponsible 
governor through both politicians’ partisan attachments. Fiscally conservative 
voters in states with a governor from the national opposition party, on the other 
hand, could interpret high debt levels at least partly as a bad signal about the 
federal-level opposition candidate – due to her partisan link to the fiscally 
irresponsible state-level governor. This indirect negative effect on the election 
prospects of the opposition candidate more than offsets the direct negative 
effect on the federal-level incumbent party candidate – such that the latter 
effectively gains from high levels of state debt (in line with proposition 2). Note 
also that the effects on state-level debt are statistically stronger than those for 
economic growth ((Chi²(1)=17.50; p<0.001). This is interesting given that state-
level fiscal outcomes are predominantly driven by state-level political decisions 
                                                 
17
 This reduced statistical significance is due to the inclusion of state-level debt, rather 
than to 2008 being dropped from the sample. Indeed, re-estimating the models in 
Columns (1) through (3) on the sample without 2008 gives very similar results as 
those presented in Columns (1) through (3). 
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(i.e., low wn) and should not normally affect federal election outcomes except 
through local incumbents’ party-political connections to the national 
incumbent/opposition candidates. 
____________________ 
Table 3 about here 
____________________ 
These results remain valid under three additional robustness checks (besides 
those reported in earlier footnotes). In the first of these, we added the vote share 
of the current presidential incumbent-party candidate in the previous election to 
the model. Properly specified, this is not a lagged dependent variable (such that 
we can ignore problems associated with such variables for panel estimations). 
While the introduction of such lagged electoral success increases the 
explanatory power of the model and mostly displays negative signs (suggesting 
a ‘cost of ruling’; Frey and Schneider, 1978; Geys, 2010), our central findings 
are robust to this addition. Second, although federal-level effects are contained 
in our year effects, we also experimented with the inclusion of federal-level 
GDP growth. This, as expected, always has a significant positive effect on the 
incumbent party candidate’s vote share, but its addition does not affect the 
findings reported above. Finally, although the analysis thus far includes both 
incumbents running for re-election and incumbent‐party candidates, our 
theoretical model considers only the former. Restricting the sample to only 
incumbents running for re-election provides results that are equivalent to those 
reported above. 
 
3.3. THREATS TO IDENTIFICATION
18
 
                                                 
18
 We are grateful to Jon Fiva, Lucy Goodhart and three anonymous referees for useful 
discussions and suggestions while developing this section. 
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The analysis above disregards two potential threats to our identification 
strategy. First, changes in partisan alignment may derive from both changes in 
the US presidency or the state governorship. However, only the former can 
reasonably be treated as exogenous to the state-level, while the latter may be 
endogenous to the local economic situation – especially when the president has 
some effect on local outcomes. We try to account for this in two ways. In the 
first, we replicate our analysis under two conditions: restricting the sample to 
those cases where there was a) no change in governorship, and b) a change in 
governorship. The underlying identifying assumption here is that selection into 
the aligned versus unaligned condition is predominantly related to exogenous 
changes in the presidency for sample (a), while it is determined by possibly 
endogenous gubernatorial shifts in sample (b). Hence, if self-selection affects 
our results, this should be largely cleared out of the results on the first sample, 
and concentrate in the latter sample. Table 4 indicates that our earlier results are 
entirely driven by the unchanged-governor subsample. This is reassuring as it 
indicates that local fiscal conditions matter for presidential elections only when 
local incumbents have presided over the state long enough and thus can truly be 
kept accountable for these conditions. More importantly, however, it implies 
that potential self-selection is not driving our results as the potential 
endogeneity problem discussed above is smallest in this sample.  
____________________ 
Table 4 about here 
____________________ 
The second attempt to tackle potential ‘self-selection’ effects from the 
(partial) endogeneity of gubernatorial elections is to restrict the sample to those 
states where governors narrowly lost/won the previous election (as narrow 
elections involve some degree of randomness; Lee, 2008; Petterson-Lidbom, 
2008). Unfortunately, moving closer to the 50% election threshold reduces the 
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number of observations to the point where credible regression analysis becomes 
unworkable. While the 3% and 5% margin we report below may not be as 
‘close’ as we would like, sample size constraints prevent exploiting even closer 
elections. Data on gubernatorial election margins were retrieved from List and 
Sturm (2006). 
____________________ 
Table 5 about here 
____________________ 
Table 5 illustrates that, if anything, our results in this restricted sample 
become substantially stronger. Indeed, the difference in the estimated effects of 
state-level economic growth and state-level debt as well as the statistical 
significance of this difference increases compared to our baseline results in 
Table 3. Hence, once again, we can conclude that potential self-selection of 
governors does not appear to be driving our results. 
Second, as mentioned, (un)observed factors simultaneously affecting 
presidential election results and state-level economic variables are 
unproblematic for our analysis as long as such elements do not have a 
differential effect across the aligned and unaligned subsamples. Such 
differential impact appears highly unlikely for general shocks such as economic 
recessions, inflation or oil-price shocks (remember that both samples do not 
significantly differ in terms of containing states with substantial oil production). 
However, US presidents themselves could have different impacts on economic 
conditions in different states due to the president’s influence over the 
distribution of federal grants and the fact that such grants are often significantly 
(re)directed to aligned lower-level governments (Ansolabehere et al., 2002; 
Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2006; Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro, 2008). This 
may imply that shifts in federal grants could both increase presidential 
popularity and affect economic conditions more strongly in aligned compared to 
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unaligned states. This is important for our analysis since, in line with previous 
work, the real growth rate of per capita federal grants is significantly higher in 
aligned compared to unaligned states in our sample (i.e., p=0.066 when 
comparing one-year growth rates in federal grants; p=0.149 when comparing 
two-year growth rates).
19
 To assess whether such differentiated grant policies 
are driving our results, Table 6 reports findings where we directly control for 
the real growth rate of per capita federal grants to the state in the two-year 
period prior to the presidential elections.  
____________________ 
Table 6 about here 
____________________ 
Table 6 clearly illustrates that our results our not driven by differentiated 
grant policies in aligned and unaligned states. Indeed, our core findings for state 
personal income growth (stronger positive effect in aligned states) and state 
debt (negative effect in aligned and positive effect in unaligned states) persist 
even when we control directly for the fact that aligned states on average benefit 
from a stronger increase in federal grants in the two years prior to the 
presidential elections (the same holds when using the one-year growth in 
federal-level grants). Moreover, looking at the ‘full sample’ results in column 
(1), the growth of federal-level grants appears to have a statistically significant 
negative effect on the incumbent president’s election results. One possible 
                                                 
19
  Note that if US presidents have an incentive to engage in strategic grant allocations 
especially when presidential popularity declines (e.g., as a vote-buying strategy), 
federal grants are endogenous and causation runs from popularity to grants rather 
than from grants to popularity. This is of relatively minor concern here since it 
would bias our estimates ‘downward’: i.e., it would induce a negative relation 
between popularity and growth and a positive one between popularity and debt in 
aligned states (and vice versa). 
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explanation for this counter-intuitive finding is suggested in columns (2) and 
(3). Here we observe that the effect of the growth of federal grants is weakly 
positive in aligned states, but significantly negative in unaligned states, with the 
difference between both effects statistically significant at conventional levels 
(Chi
2
=7.88, p<0.01). Within our theoretical framework, exactly such 
differentiated effects would arise when state governors are able to capture most 
of the political esteem from the increase in federal-level grants (e.g., by 
claiming credit for improved public provisions but suppressing that federal 
grants made them possible). Indeed, as such ‘capture’ implies that wn declines, 
the growth in federal grants will mainly have an indirect effect on presidential 
election outcomes (i.e., through the partisan link with the governor). This 
indirect effect will be positive in aligned states and negative in unaligned states. 
The reason is that the credit awarded to the governor will rub off on the 
incumbent candidate in the presidential race in aligned states, but will benefit 
the opposition candidate in unaligned states. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
When governing power is shared between a national- and lower-level of 
government, accountability has been argued to decline as only overall public 
policy outcomes are observed (Anderson, 2006, 2008; Joanis, 2009, 
forthcoming; The Economist, 27 October 2012, 39). In this paper, we argue that 
voters can obtain additional information about politicians through their party-
political attachments because politicians’ party membership provides cues about 
their characteristics and likely behaviour once elected (Jones and Hudson, 1998; 
Caillaud and Tirole, 2002; Snyder and Ting, 2002, 2003; Geys and Vermeir, 
2008a). As a result, we show that the performance of incumbents at sub-national 
levels of government can help voters evaluate the national incumbent. This 
alleviates the above-mentioned incomplete information issues and weakens 
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adverse selection problems under multilevel governance structures. Though not 
explicitly addressed in this article, the same line of argument likewise suggests 
that the performance of incumbents at the federal government level may assist 
voters in judging local-level politicians.  
Evidence from presidential election results across all 50 US states over the 
period 1972-2008 is supportive of our theoretical predictions. Specifically, we 
find that state-level public performance influences presidential election 
outcomes even for policy areas where national-level candidates can be expected 
to have very little influence (e.g., state-level debt). Moreover, and crucially, 
such effects depend on the presence/absence of a partisan affiliation between 
the state governor and the US president. For instance, state-level debt has a 
statistically significant negative effect in states where the governor belongs to 
the same party as the US president (as a result of party cues ‘bad’ local 
performance here reflects badly on an incumbent president from the same party) 
and a statistically significant positive effect in states run by governors 
associated with the national-level opposition party (as ‘bad’ local performance 
now hurts the presidential opposition candidate). Overall, politicians’ 
membership of a political party appears to provide an important mechanism (i.e. 
party cues) to alleviate voters’ incomplete information about national politicians 
under multilevel governance. 
Nonetheless, the availability of party cues in a federal setting may also have 
an important drawback, since they can lead to a reduction in politicians’ effort 
under certain conditions. Particularly, they may cause the national incumbent to 
exert zero effort when the national and regional incumbents are unaligned. 
Since a similar prediction does not materialize when politicians across 
government levels are aligned, this suggests a rationale for forming “similar 
coalition governments in the federal and regional arenas” (Swenden, 2002, 80). 
Such aligned or ‘congruent’ governments have been a frequent feature of 
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Belgian politics since the direct election of regional parliaments in the mid-
1990s, but appear unusual outside the Belgian system (Swenden, 2002). Our 
analysis indicates, however, that it can have clear benefits in terms of the 
incentives of politicians. 
Although our analysis using the US political system provides substantial 
supportive evidence regarding the predictions of our model, and illustrates that 
party cues are an important dimension in elections in a multilevel governance 
context, more work is clearly required. From a theoretical perspective, it would 
be interesting to extend the normative side of our analysis to derive more 
explicit conclusions regarding the ‘optimal’ weight of the national incumbent in 
determining public output in a particular jurisdiction (i.e., nw ) or the ‘optimal’ 
degree of intra-party cohesion (). While the former would contribute to a 
better understanding – and evaluation – of the tendency since the 1980s towards 
more decentralized government structures (Rodden 2006, Freitag and Vatter 
2008), the latter may help explain the wide variation across countries in the 
extent to which candidates of the same party follow strictly a party line. From 
an empirical standpoint, further research should, for instance, verify the 
existence of similar effects in political contexts with more than two parties – 
taking into account potential difficulties posed in such settings by coalition 
governments. The German institutional setting appears a fruitful testing-ground 
for such extension. Also, our empirical analysis only establishes that state-level 
economic outcomes can influence presidential election results even for policy 
fields where the president arguably has little or no influence. Future research 
should address the reverse prediction that voters might well react at the state 
level to federal-level outcomes over which state-level politicians have little or 
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no influence.
20
 Preliminary, though suggestive, evidence in this direction using 
Canadian data is provided in Gélineau and Bélanger (2005). They show that 
provincial incumbents in Canada are “punished for national economic 
deterioration when the incumbent federal party is of the same partisan family” 
(Gélineau and Bélanger, 2005, 407, italics added), whereas no similar effect 
arises in provinces controlled by a national opposition party. Our model 
provides a micro-economic foundation for such an observation. Finally, our 
argument implies that the assessment of incumbents at sub-national levels of 
governments influences the assessment of candidates of the same party at the 
federal level. An important avenue for future work would be to exploit 
individual-level data to more directly test this proposition. 
 
                                                 
20
  This prediction follows from a straightforward extension of our model to the 
analysis of regional elections. Assuming that voters only observe output in their own 
jurisdiction and that regional incumbents maximize their vote share, it is easy to 
establish – analogous to Proposition 1 above – that even when the regional 
incumbent has almost no influence on (regional) policy outcomes (wn→1), public 
output can still affect the election result of the regional incumbent. 
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Table 1: Partisan alignment (1972-2008) 
Years Aligned US States 
1972 AZ, CA, CO, CT, DE, IL, IN, IA, MA, MI, NH, NJ, NY, OR, TN, VT, VA, WA, WV, WY. 
1976 AK, IN, IA, KS, MI, MO, NH, NC, OH, SC, VA, WA, WV. 
1980 AZ, AR, CA, CO, CT, FL, GA, HI, ID, KS, KY, ME, MD, MA, MS, MO, MT, NH, NJ, NM, NY, NC, ND, OK, RI, SC, UT, WA, 
WV, WY. 
1984 CA, DE, IL, IN, IA, MO, NH, NJ, ND, OR, PA, SD, TN, VT, WA. 
1988 AL, CA, DE, FL, IL, IN, IA, KS, ME, MO, NE, NH, NJ, NM, NC, OK, RI, SC, SD, TX, UT, VT, WV, WI. 
1992 AL, AZ, CA, IL, IA, KS, LA, ME, MA, MI, MN, MS, MO, MT, NH, NC, ND, OH, SC, SD, UT, WI. 
1996 AL, AK, CO, DE, FL, GA, HI, IN, KY, MD, MO, NE, NV, NC, OR, VT, WA, WV. 
2000 AL, AK, CA, DE, GA, HI, IN, IA, KY, MD, MS, MO, NH, NC, OR, SC, VT, WA. 
2004 AL, AK, AR, CA, CO, CT, FL, GA, HI, ID, KY, MD, MA, MN, MS, MT, NE, NV, NH, NY, ND, OH, RI, SC, SD, TX, UT, VT. 
2008 AL, AK, CA, CT, FL, GA, HI, ID, IN, LA, MN, MS, MO, NE, NV, ND, RI, SC, SD, TX, UT, VT. 
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Table 2: Comparison of average state characteristics by partisan alignment of states 
 
Incumbent 
Vote Share 
Incumbent 
Vote Share 
(1972-1988) 
Incumbent 
Vote Share 
(1992-2008) 
Pers. Inc. 
Growth 
GDP 
Growth 
Debt Turnout Deficit 
Federal 
grants 
Oil 
producer 
Pop. Size 
(Mio) 
Term 
Limit 
Aligned 51.869 52.863 50.931 2.265 3.812 1777.74 55.818 344.929 757.274 0.157 5.136 0.604 
Unaligned 52.825 55.901 49.620 2.133 3.657 1772.49 55.097 364.492 730.274 0.197 4.931 0.626 
Aligned = 
Unaligned 
p=0.27 p=0.01 p=0.24 p=0.44 p=0.62 p=0.97 p=0.30 p=0.72 p=0.45 p=0.25 p=0.72 p=0.66 
Note: Incumbent Vote Share is the vote share of national incumbent party candidate (our main dependent variable). Pers Inc Growth is the 2-year growth rate in state-level 
personal income, GDP growth is the 2-year growth rate in state-level GDP, Debt is total state-level debt outstanding per capita, Turnout is the state-level turnout rate in 
presidential elections, Debt is total state-level deficit (expenditures minus revenues) per capita, Federal Grants is total state-level grants (per capita) received from US 
federal government, Oil producer is 1 if state produces more than 1% of US oil, Population Size is the state population in millions and Term Limit is 1 if state has term 
limit legislation for governors. 
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Table 3: Main results  
Variable 
(1) 
Full sample 
(2) 
‘same 
party’ 
(3) 
‘different 
party’ 
(4) 
Full sample 
(5) 
‘same 
party’ 
(6) 
‘different 
party’ 
Intercept 49.365 *** 
(6.99) 
42.456 *** 
(4.14) 
38.710 *** 
(3.36) 
53.164 *** 
(7.85) 
66.306 *** 
(5.33) 
32.612 ** 
(2.65) 
Pers. Inc. Growth 
(2-year growth rate) 
0.738 ** 
(2.14) 
1.419 ** 
(2.42) 
0.460 
(1.50) 
0.727 ** 
(2.12) 
1.289 ** 
(2.01) 
0.550 * 
(1.78) 
State debt 
(in election quarter) 
- - - 0.001 * 
(1.81) 
-0.002 ** 
(-2.55) 
0.003 ** 
(2.47) 
Voter turnout -0.068 
(-0.68) 
0.043 
(0.28) 
0.108 
(0.59) 
-0.146 
(-1.28) 
-0.230 
(-1.08) 
0.207 
(0.92) 
Home IPC 2.439 
(1.30) 
2.065 
(0.97) 
3.833 
(1.52) 
2.685 
(1.08) 
4.171 
(1.54) 
5.030 * 
(1.97) 
Home RPC -9.289 *** 
(-4.63) 
-3.392  
(-1.41) 
-11.776 *** 
(-9.33) 
-9.451 *** 
(-4.23) 
-0.846  
(-0.36) 
-11.809 *** 
(-6.30) 
Incumbent 14.960 *** 
(12.59) 
12.382 *** 
(5.60) 
20.471 *** 
(7.35) 
14.311 *** 
(6.95) 
5.146 *** 
(2.92) 
18.099 *** 
(7.93) 
Year fixed effects 
State fixed effects 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes  
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
 
(same=diff)_growth 
(same=diff)_debt 
 
  
3.03 * 
- 
  
1.61 
17.50 *** 
Number obs. 
R² overall 
500 
40.73 
210 
32.11 
290 
43.00 
450 
39.62 
188 
32.39 
262 
28.66 
Note: Dependent variable is vote share of national incumbent party candidate. The t-values between brackets are 
based on heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors; *** significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
‘Same=diff’ exploits a Wald-type test to evaluate whether the coefficient estimates of Pers. Inc. Growth 
(growth) and State debt (debt) are statistically distinguishable from each other across both sub-samples (the 
test statistic has a Chi² distribution and should be evaluated under 1 degree of freedom).  
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Table 4: Regression results controlling for ‘endogenous’ gubernatorial elections 
Variable 
Unchanged state-level incumbent Changed state-level incumbent 
(1) 
‘same 
party’ 
(2) 
‘different 
party’ 
(3) 
‘same 
party’ 
(4) 
‘different 
party’ 
(5) 
‘same 
party’ 
(6) 
‘different 
party’ 
(7) 
‘same 
party’ 
(8) 
‘different 
party’ 
Intercept 29.773 
(1.13) 
62.873 *** 
(3.59) 
56.548 * 
(1.95) 
16.446 
(0.73) 
51.320 *** 
(3.91) 
22.273 
(1.09) 
37.203 
(1.58) 
30.221 
(1.51) 
Pers. Inc. Growth 
(2-year growth rate) 
0.737 
(1.30) 
-0.287 
(-0.73) 
0.429 
(0.50) 
-0.233 
(-0.49) 
1.849 * 
(1.77) 
0.628 
(0.96) 
1.864 * 
(1.85) 
0.878 
(1.23) 
State debt 
(in election quarter) 
- - -0.005 ** 
(-3.09) 
0.006 *** 
(3.68) 
- - -0.001 
(-0.37) 
0.000 
(0.09) 
Year fixed effects 
State fixed effects 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes  
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes  
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
 
(same=diff)_growth 
(same=diff)_debt 
 
 
2.64 [p = 0.104] 
- 
 
0.80 
44.61 *** 
 
2.14 [p = 0.140] 
- 
 
1.41 
0.21 
Number obs. 
R² overall 
123 
13.41 
158 
31.70 
104 
10.46 
139 
13.88 
83 
39.19 
122 
34.34 
80 
39.18 
113 
44.02 
Note: Dependent variable is vote share of national incumbent party candidate. The t-values between brackets are based on heteroscedasticity-consistent 
standard errors; *** significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. ‘Same=diff’ exploits a Wald-type test to evaluate whether the coefficient estimates of 
Pers. Inc. Growth (growth) and State debt (debt) are statistically distinguishable from each other (the test statistic has a Chi² distribution and should be 
evaluated under 1 degree of freedom. Full set of controls as in Table 3 is included in all regressions. 
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Table 5: Robustness checks  
Variable 
Alternative definition of 
partisan alignment 
Margin < 5% Margin < 3% Interaction effects 
(1) 
‘same 
party’ 
(2) 
‘different 
party’ 
(3) 
‘same 
party’ 
(4) 
‘different 
party’ 
(5) 
‘same 
party’ 
(6) 
‘different 
party’ 
(7) 
Full  
sample 
(8) 
Margin  
< 2% 
Intercept 69.904 *** 
(4.53) 
49.337 *** 
(6.82) 
56.556 *** 
(4.39) 
45.376 ** 
(2.41) 
36.773 
(0.72) 
77.674 *** 
(4.88) 
58.265 *** 
(8.52) 
55.672 ** 
(2.54) 
Pers. Inc. Growth 
(2-year growth rate) 
0.946 * 
(1.81) 
0.704 * 
(1.95) 
0.093 
(0.12) 
-1.213 
(-1.12) 
-0.254 
(-0.17) 
-1.390 * 
(-1.74) 
- - 
State debt 
(in election quarter) 
-0.003 *** 
(-2.96) 
0.002 ** 
(2.50) 
-0.008 ** 
(-2.40) 
0.003 
(1.52) 
-0.007 * 
(-1.85) 
0.005 ** 
(2.52) 
- - 
Pers. Inc. Growth 
* ‘same party’ 
- - - - - - 0.762 
(1.30) 
3.146 ** 
(2.26) 
Pers. Inc. Growth 
* ‘different party’ 
- - - - - - 0.730 ** 
(2.41) 
-0.777 
(-0.73) 
State debt 
* ‘same party’ 
- - - - - - 0.000 
(0.22) 
-0.002 
(-0.44) 
State debt 
* ‘different party’ 
- - - - - - 0.002 * 
(1.68) 
0.003 
(0.90) 
Year fixed effects 
State fixed effects 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes  
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes  
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
 
(same=diff)_growth 
(same=diff)_debt 
 
 
0.26 
21.19 *** 
 
2.23 [p=0.14] 
19.23 *** 
 
1.07 *** 
18.31 *** 
 
0.00 
5.15 ** 
 
7.59 *** 
9.36 *** 
Number obs. 
R² overall 
85 
29.46 
356 
37.09 
96 
34.76 
102 
14.56 
65 
29.05 
56 
6.73 
450 
39.69 
85 
30.89 
Note: Dependent variable is vote share of national incumbent party candidate. The t-values between brackets are based on heteroscedasticity-consistent standard 
errors; *** significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. ‘Same=diff’ exploits a Wald-type test to evaluate whether the coefficient estimates of Pers. Inc. Growth 
(growth) and State debt (debt) are statistically distinguishable from each other across both sub-samples. The test statistic has a Chi² distribution for Columns (1) to 
(6) and an F distribution in Columns (7) and (8) – and should be evaluated under 1 degree of freedom in all cases. Same/different party in Columns (1) and (2) 
based on state governor, House and Senate being (un)aligned with US President, whereas Columns (3) to (8) are based on state governor being (un)aligned with 
US President. Columns (3) to (6) and (8) restrict the sample to states where the governor was elected with a narrow margin (<5%, <3%, or <2% respectively). Full 
set of controls as in Table 3 is included in all regressions. 
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Table 6: Regression results controlling for growth in federal-level grants 
Variable 
(1) 
Full sample 
(2) 
‘same party’ 
(3) 
‘different 
party’ 
Intercept 54.526 *** 
(8.18) 
59.472 *** 
(4.45) 
37.006 *** 
(3.06) 
Pers. Inc. Growth 
(2-year growth rate) 
0.700 ** 
(2.07) 
1.338 ** 
(2.04) 
0.540 * 
(1.65) 
State debt 
(in election quarter) 
0.001 * 
(1.72) 
-0.002 *** 
(-2.79) 
0.003 *** 
(2.75) 
Federal grants 
(2-year growth rate) 
-0.076 * 
(-1.86) 
0.043 
(1.52) 
-0.121 ** 
(-2.07) 
Year fixed effects 
State fixed effects 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes  
Yes 
 
(same=diff)_growth 
(same=diff)_debt 
(same=diff)_grants 
 
  
1.82  [p=0.17] 
19.01 *** 
7.88 *** 
Number obs. 
R² overall 
450 
39.79 
188 
32.14 
262 
30.24 
Note: Dependent variable is vote share of national incumbent party candidate. The t-values 
between brackets are based on heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors; *** significant 
at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. ‘Same=diff’ exploits a Wald-type test to evaluate whether 
the coefficient estimates of Pers. Inc. Growth (growth), State debt (debt) and federal-level 
grants (grants) are statistically distinguishable from each other across both sub-samples (the 
test statistic has a Chi² distribution and should be evaluated under 1 degree of freedom). 
Full set of controls as in Table 3 is included in all regressions. 
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Appendix: Lemmas and proof of Proposition 3 
 
Lemma 1  
Voters’ uncertainty regarding their vote choice – reflected in the updated 
variance of the difference in quality between the national incumbent and 
opposition candidate – is 
(i) higher in a federal compared to a unitary context 
(ii) smaller in the aligned compared to the unaligned case  
Moreover,  
(iii) party cues always reduce the updated variance of the difference in 
quality in the aligned case 
(iv) party cues reduce the updated variance of the difference in quality 
whenever )2/(  nw  in the unaligned case 
 
Proof:  
In the unitary context, voters cannot learn anything about the national 
opposition candidate. Hence, the updated variance of the national opposition 
candidate’s quality, conditional on realized output, is 
2
q . They do learn, 
however, about the policy quality of the national incumbent, which removes all 
uncertainty about her q. Consequently, the variance of the difference of both 
candidates’ q is: 
 
  2)( qion xqqVar   (15) 
 
In the federal context, we have to distinguish between the aligned and unaligned 
case. In the aligned case, the variance of the difference in quality, conditional on 
realized output, equals:  
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In the unaligned case, the variance of the difference between both candidates, 
conditional on output, becomes:  
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Since 0≤wn≤1 and 0<η<1, it can easily be seen that the updated variances in 
equations (16) and (17) are always larger than the updated variance in equation 
(15), proving section (i) of Lemma 1. For the same reason, it is clear that the 
updated variance is smaller in the aligned compared to the unaligned case, 
validating section (ii) of Lemma 1. 
 
In the federal setting without party cues, we have that the updated variance 
equals: 
 
  2
22
2
)
)1(
2()( q
nn
n
ion
ww
w
xqqVar 

  (18) 
 
This is always larger than the updated variance in (16). Therefore, in the aligned 
case, the existence of party cues lead to less uncertainty regarding the difference 
in quality between the two candidates, which proves part (iii) of Lemma 1. 
Similarly, using equation (17), it can easily be shown that the same is only true 
in the unaligned case whenever )2/(  nw , which proves part (iv) of 
Lemma 1. ■ 
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Lemma 2 The impact of public output on the vote share of the national 
incumbent is larger in a unitary context than in a federal context, when 
wn<½ in the aligned case and when wn<(η+1)/2  in the unaligned case. 
 
Proof: 
In a unitary context, the national incumbent has full responsibility for public 
output (wn=1). From equation (5), we therefore know that β=1 in a unitary 
context. In a federal context, we must distinguish the aligned and unaligned 
cases. For the impact of public output on the national incumbent’s vote share to 
be lower in the aligned case, we must have that: 
 
1
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It can easily be shown that this is the case whenever wn<½. In the unaligned 
case, we must have that: 
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Some manipulation of equation (14) indicates that this holds whenever 
wn<(η+1)/2. ■ 
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Lemma 3 Party cues increase (decrease) the impact of public output on the 
national incumbent’s vote share when the national and regional incumbents 
are aligned and wn<½ (wn>½). Party cues always decrease the impact of 
public output on the national incumbent’s vote share when the national and 
regional incumbents are unaligned. 
 
Proof: 
The proof of Lemma 3 follows directly from a comparison of equations (9) and 
(10) with equation (11). Note thereby that β is effectively given by the 
difference between the covariance of the incumbent’s policy quality and output 
and the covariance of the opposition candidate’s policy quality and output, 
divided by the variance of output. In the aligned case, party cues increase the 
covariance of the incumbent’s policy quality and output, but also increase the 
variance of output. When wn<½, the numerator effect dominates and β increases 
as a result of party cues (and vice versa when wn>½).  ■ 
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Proof of Proposition 3: 
Given the strict convexity of the cost function, optimal effort of the national 
incumbent in a unitary setting will be higher than in a federal setting if the 
marginal cost of effort is higher. We must show that this conclusion holds both 
in the aligned and unaligned case. Assuming that the national incumbent in a 
unitary context maximizes the average of the vote share in each region, equation 
(8) indicates that her optimal effort choice is determined by: 
)(
)(2 22
ni
iq
eC
M
B

 
 (19) 
 
Hence, using equations (19), (8) and (9), in the aligned case we must have 
that:
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Similarly, using equations (19), (8) and (10), in the unaligned case we must 
have that: 
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It can easily be seen that both inequalities always hold, which proves that 
optimal effort of the national incumbent in a unitary setting exceeds her optimal 
effort in a federal setting. 
 
                                                 
21
  Note that 2 , M and B always appear on both sides of the inequality, such that they 
are dropped here for notational convenience. 
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Turning to parts i) and ii) of Proposition 3, we know from equations (8) and (9) 
that party cues increase the national incumbent’s effort when: 
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Using equations (9) and (11), inequality (20) can also be written as: 
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The left-hand side of equation (21) is always positive since all its 
constituting terms are positive. From Lemma 3, it follows that the right-hand 
side is positive when wn<½, and negative when wn>½. Hence, for the effort of 
the national incumbent to increase with party cues in the aligned case, her 
weight in public output creation should be less than one half and 
2
q  should be 
small relative to 
2
i . 
Similarly, using equations (8) and (10), we know that party cues will 
decrease the national incumbent’s effort when: 
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Straightforward manipulations indicate that this is always true since 0≤wn≤1 
and 0<η<1, which proves part ii) of Proposition 3. 
Finally, to analyse when effort is higher in the aligned compared to the 
unaligned case, we must distinguish two cases. The first is when wn≤η/(1+η). In 
that case, we know from Proposition 2 that βu<0, which leads to a corner 
solution for optimal effort where effort is 0 (see equation (8)). An aligned 
incumbent, however, always exerts non-zero effort, such that effort will be 
higher in the aligned compared to the unaligned case. In the other case – i.e. 
1>wn>η/(1+η) – we have to verify when: 
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It is easy to show that, using Equations (9) and (10), this is equivalent to: 
 
)
11
()1(2
22
22
au
iqnn ww

    (24) 
 
The left-hand side of equation (24) is always positive since all its constituting 
terms are positive. Since a>u in a federal setting (see Proposition 2), the right-
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hand side will also be positive. Hence, when 1>wn>η/(1+η), effort in the aligned 
case can still exceed that in the unaligned case as long as 
2
q  is small relative to 
2
i , and wn and η are both small. ■ 
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